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FOREWORD 
T HE DRIFT toward business combination, sometimes open, some- times secret, has heen a conspicuous feature of the national and 
international economy of the last two generations. Government has 
often attacked these combinations and, in other instances, has sanc- 
tioned them, as in the case of many international cartels, and with 
NRA in this country in the recent depression. 
There is no doubt that, aside from the United Nations in the war 
emergency, business organizations form our chief international struc- 
ture. No political diplomacy is so swift and sure as the working of 
international cartels. These networks of business combination reach 
across frontiers knowing no patriotism, only the call of profit. 
There is a serious question as to whether international political 
organization can be made strong enough to cope with the interna- 
tional business organizations which already exist. If international 
economic agenci&- are set up to deal with currency stabilization, 
investment, food, and so forth, will they be strong enough to 
cope with the half concealed business groups which span national 
boundaries? 
Because we believe that a n  understanding of international cartels 
is essential to an understanding of the post-war problems we face, 
the Post War World Council is pleased to offer this pamphlet as 
a valuable basis for study. It is a condensation of a report by 
Dr. Corwin D. Edwards, prepared for and published by the Sub- 
Committee on War Mobilization of the Senate Committee on Mili- 
tary Affairs, Senator Harley M. Kilgore, chairman. Every effort has 
been made, while reducing the length of the original report dras- 
tically, to preserve its tone and spirit. 
* POST WAR WORLD COUNCIL 
December, 1944 
INTERNATIONAL CARTELS I 1 
1 , 
AND WORLD PEACE 
. , #: w 
C A R T E L  activities are arrangements among business enterprises - 
- engaged in the same type of industry to avoid some or all forms . 
of competition. 
International cartels are cartels which include business enterprises 
domiciled under more than one government and doing bushes across 
national frontiers. A cartel of this type may include the major enter- 
prises operating in a-given industrial field throughout the world, and 
may determine trade policies in that field in most of the world's prin- . 
cipd markets. 
Uhless there is an international cartel, the power of a business group 
. within a single country is li&ted by foreign competition, subject to 
whatever protection tariff policies and international shipping costs . 
may provide. 
Principal Types of International Cartel: 
I. The Asmciation :-The international cartel association resembles 
a national trade association which is engaged in rktrictive activities. - 
Tlqz menabers of such a body are producing companies in various 
nadons. The cartel arrangement is expressed in a more or less formal 
' 
agreement to which all are parties or in the rules and regulations of . 
tbe associatibn itself. Such cartels may formally agree to fix prices; 
to l i d t  and apportion output, sales, or exports; to allocate market 
territories; to redistribute profits in accordance with an agreed for- 
mula; or even to sell through a jointly maintained sales agency. - ' . 
2. The Pagent Licensing Agreement:-Amobg large manufacturing 
' ;  
enterprises, especially in industrieiin which technological progress has 
been rapid, the most common type of international cartel is the agree-. 
ment as to patents and processes. Such an agreement rests upon-the . 3 
fact that the participants in the cartel hold patents and/or operate 
under patent licenses. In most countries the control of a,patent gives ' 
the owner certain monopolistic rights. 
A fully developed patents and processes agreement is a market- 
sharing arrangement based upon ap arrangement for exchange of 
the results of scientific .research. Each party to the agreement under-- 
takes to grant to the other the right to make use of the processeg 
developed in its research, both past and future. The achievements of 
the research are patented inevery country covered by the agreement, 
and the right to use is conveyed by assignment of the patents or by 
licenses under the patents. The allocation of markets is carried out 
by means of such assignments and licenses. 
In addition to the allocation of territories and industrial fields which 
is involved in the scope of the patent licenses, the terms of these 
licenses may contain provisions as to the prices at which the license& 
may sell, the quantities they may produce, the types of concerns 
through which they may distribute, and various other aspects of their 
business activities. 
As a network of interrelated patents and processes agreements is 
developed, it necessarily requires a tacit if not an explicit acceptance 
by each company of a series of agreements to which that company 
is not a party. When Imperial Chemical Industries makes an agree- 
- ment with du Pont, it must introduce into this agreement restrictions 
which adequately, recognize and protect its commitments to I. Go 
 arbe en and Solvay. In dealing with other chemical companies, 
'du Pont must likewise avoid commitments inconsistent with those 
it has made to Imperial Chemical Industries, and Imperial Chemical 
Industries must observe the limitations of its contract with du Pont. 
A series of mutually related undertakings such as this, governing 
progressively larger portions of the technology of the chemical indus- 
try, must make it increasingly di$cult for any chemical company to 
follow an independent commercial policy without involving itseif in 
such ~crificc of alliances and loss of information as must be too costly 
to be willingly accepted. 
Since the significance of any single patents and processes agreement 
is thus enhanced by its relation to other similar agreements, the full 
effect of patent license controls within a given industry can be ascer- 
tained only by surveying the entire pattern of such controls, not by 
examining individual patent licenses. 
Cartel arrangements based upon patents may endure far -beyond 
'the statutory limits of the patent grant. Contracts which cover both 
existing and future patents may continue in effect indefinitely, for 
new patents age invoked to support allocation of territories as the old 
patents expire. 
. 3. The Combine:-The third form of cartel is the combine. It con- 
-h 
I 
rsob i a a t m t j t i d  alks ~ t .  by a a f a c e  bbt by ~Gting mmppitor~ 
undei a corn ~wnersbip or mw$emcnt. Corporate structure rhuD - 
, b e S  the basks for market tommb In the simplest ,Ad most fib ' -  
quent case, a small ~ ~ T P C ) Z &  combination-in a particular fkld d I 
indwtdd aCt;vity is part of a larger cartel pattern maintained by q; 
intercoxprate corntracts of, broader scope. lh a few instances, the 
&G&&m bf m e '  or two ' concerns &e so extensive as to donstimte : '  
W b r  portion of an international erne1 arrangement. 
u : .'* 'narrower types of carteliza$on through ownership may be *' 
&iadtl. and simply illustrated. As a part of a broader systtim of inter- ' 
corporate arrangements, the du Pont Co. shares with a subsidiary of 
I. Go Farbenindustrie ownership of the 3ayer-Semesa.n Co., through 
which both great corporations cairy on all of their business in ~ & d  
States peitaining to seed disinfectants. In Canada, C a n a d i ~  Indus: 
ui&, *Ltd., is the jointly owned subsidiary of du Pont and Imperial 
Chemical Industries, which. have mutually agreed that in Chemical 
fields occ@ied by both companies th& chemical manufacturing and 
importing activities Canada shall be undertaken exclusivdy by this 
~obsidiary. -Both in Brazil -and in Argentina the same two grek com- 
panies have o r h i e d  subsidiaries known as Duperial, and in each 
>cit&$they have agreed to do business in the country only through tihi; 
.,? $a*. - . 3 
- > 
' The &re I exte.givi , . $  i internatioqal combines resemble the great cor- ,! 
&$ie 'structyyx- which 3 '  , are familiar within any modern. industrid 
&@fry. 5 +. cqsa they consist *of groups of corporations bound ' 
togetha by. ilqborate interlockbgs of stack ownership. International , 
. TeiePhOhe '& T=le$riph'Co, for examhk, is a holding cdmpany which . I, 
.holds all or most of the stock of a' variety of cable, radio commUBica- a '. 
ti& h d  .telephone ;Companies throughout' the world. It a h  holds 
the stock of ~nter~l~ational standard E1&ctric~ Corporation, which id 
turn is a holding company controIling companies throughout the ' 
world engaged in the manufaaure of comm~cations, equipment. 
Similarly, there are in many different countries companies organ&d ; 
under the name of N. V. Philips engaged in the manufacture and : 
distribution of radio equipment, electric light bulbs, and other el=- 
trical suklies. With so much of the field of electrical .manufacture ' 
brought together under the ownership of Philips and International 
Telephone & Telegraph, it is a relatively simple matter for these two 
concerns and one or two other great organizations to complete - 
I 
6 
the pattern of world industrial cartelization by contracts among 
themselves. 
Cartels as Devices to Control Markets: 
These three types of cartel arrangement frequently supplement one 
another. The communities of interest established by combination may 
be joined into larger interest groups by agreements as to patents and 
processes and by formal membership in cartel associations. The patent 
agreements may include provision for the operation of joint subsidi- 
aries in ' particilar markets. 
Whatever their scope or type, international cartels are designed to 
,enhance profits by reducing competition. This aim is typically sought 
by direct price fixing; allocation of production, sales, shipments, or 
trade territories, in order to destroy incentives toward price cutting; 
limitation of output in order to keep prices from falling; and measures 
intended to exclude nonparticipants from the market. 
I. Control over Prices:-The central purpose of cartels is to main- 
tain prices at levels higher than would otherwise obtain. Sometimes 
this result is sought by direct price-fixing agreements, but more fre- 
quently by controls of production' and allocations of markets such as 
will be subsequently described. 
Such price control has been widely ddended as a useful stabilization 
of prices or as a necessity in order to prevent cutthroat competition. 
It has been attacked on the ground that to keep prices stable while 
underlying conditions change is merely to throw the burden of adjug- 
ment elsewhere, and that price fluctuation is prdekable to idle 
machinery and idle men. Discussion couched in such broad and 
theoretical terms is necessarily inconclusive and will not be under- 
taken here. 
The price policies followed during negotiations for the establish- 
ment of a cartel and at times when members of the cartel are 
attempting to intimidate or discipline independents must be distin- 
guished from the price policies of a period when the cartel's control 
is unquestioned. The antecedent to a cartel agreement is often a 
price war which may drive prices down to absurd levels. In public 
apologies for cartels such wars are usually treated as impersonal die 
asters for which cartel organization provides a constructive remedy. 
In fact, however, such price wars are often deliberately undertaken 
as means to coerce rebellious elements in the industry to accept what 
the cartel group is willing to offer. 
The level of prices estabhhd by-cart& after rhtir control a£ tbe 
market is assured di&s from case to case in accordance with what 
the u&c will bear. New products which have a large potentid 
market are frequently oihtd at ptcigressivelly lower prices until s 
level has betn reached which taps potenW,demand; but thereai3e.r 
further dadine in p r i c k  likely to be dm and .limited. When the 
orgzwhtian of a -cartel hao beem d& to w d y  low prices origL 
natk$:m ura-ted c lump in demand ar in produetivt m- 
- & &el maj be h e r  rhan that which fomerlp prevailed in 
. the industry, even though probably higher than that whieh would be 
PP1"f*t:k ~b .the ncfflt.ci-cie~ under competitive conditions. 
I . '  hnetma e e b h +  &aka .it possible to take advantage -of i m p -  
ti+eLnocdi, fut the product and to establish prices at oppmsiocfy high 
levels which -deprive would-be -purchasers of the opportuni~ 
to buy. ' The! extremes to which'pri& may go under some cartel 
arrangements are best indicated by'illustraticm. 
.Tuneen d i e  is a bard-metal compogition of great iadupuia 
ippxtancie ip cutting tools, d o n  d i e  and wear-resistant s&c;e8. 
It was sold in theJJnited States in rep* at @ per p ~ ~ n d .  At that 
timc Gaeral Electric and Friedrich Krupp Aktiengedkchdt b d  
an apeemeat by which their patents were pooled. General Electtic 
war giyq~ eon- 4. the tale price in the United States, and h p p  
w~ d&gqp4 to. w e  tbis prke upon its imports. Thereupon the 
-~~td .~Bpts" ,p&e rose pysm& to a maximum of $453 per porn& 
Dwhgmw - - d ,h- th i r t i az  thc ratage wap frmn $q to $455 
;&din z g q a t b t h m , p &  wos~n-t#r;gtrpound. In April 
rw- &er q indictment under the mtitmt bwi, the price rangad 
fmm i ty .m j;45 l= pound* 
The efkt  of the high price was evidently to disoourage the dm+ 
m a t  of ttujgstendide technology. A director of Rrum wrote &I 
1936 that Germany then comumd about 22 tima more of this.prduct 
per unit ofl produced std than did the United States. 'Ilk q l a n a ~  
tion for rBis lag in use was given in 1931 in a letter from a b e d  
Electric engineer which referred to the "absurdly fictitious prices .which 
are beisg maintained for carboby . (tunsm carbide) tips." H e  
. . 
asserted that the ma&-g cost was-about $8 per pound, and 
proposed vainly that the price be, reduced to %o per pound. 
The high price of certain dental plastics has been equally striking. 
As a r&dt of cartel agreements among E* I. du Pont de Nunours & 
Co., Rohm 6r Haas Co. of the U6itcd States, I. G; Farbeninddc, 
Imperial Chemical Industries, and Rohm & Haas Co. of Germany, 
the two American companies participating obtained control of the 
United States market for acrylic products, including methyl metha- 
crylate dentures. This control was used to fix prices upon dental 
plastics in the United States. Information is not readily available with 
which to appraise the basic price of 85 cents a pound which was used 
for the sale of methyl methacrylate powders to commercial molders, 
but & is obvious that, if this price covered costs, nothing but the pow= 
of the monopoly could -account for the price of $45 a pound which 
was charged in the sales of the s&e product for denture purposes 
to dental laboratories and dentists. At that time the total investment 
in methyl methacrylate manufacture at the Bell plant was $g86,000 and 
the net profit for the first 6 months of the year had been $210,000. 
Striking illustrations of the high prices which are sometimes estab- 
lished by cartel agreements are found in the field of drugs and pharma- 
ceuticals. Atabrine, a synthetic substitute for quinine, is now sold to 
the United States Government for war purposes at a price of $4.50 
per thousand tablets. 
The high prices obtained upon electric lamp bulbs in the United 
States by virtue of the interrelated restrictions of the American patent 
monopoly and the international lamp cartel are evident in the fact 
that, according to computations by the Department of Justice from 
figures supplied by the General Electric Co., from 1935 through 1939, 
General Electric's net profit on incandesceat lamps varied from 64 to 
88 percent of total costs and expenses-in lamp manufacture and from 
33 to 47. percent of the net worth of the company's lamp-producing 
investment. 
The effect of cartel agreements on dyestuffs has evidently been a 
substantial. increase in prices. 
At a conference between du Pont and Imperial Chemical Industries 
in 1937, it was agreed that proposals for new capital investment in 
manufacture in South America should be tested by their likelihood 
of yielding, after payment of all South- American taxes, a minimum 
rate of return of 15 percent' in Argentina and 17% percent in Brazil 
and Chile. 
2. Impairment of Qdity:-Though cartels seldom concern them- 
selves directly with the quality of cartelized goods, a necessary effect 
of their monopolistic character is to diminish incentives to improve 
quality and to limit opportunities for the buyer to protect himself 
against low equality. Instances are encountered in which cartel agree- 
ments maintain a market for relatively unsatisfactory goods because 
other participants in the cartel are bound not to accept the dissatisfied 
customers. 
An example appears in the agreement as to military explosives which 
divided the European market between Nobel Industries, Ltd., and 
E. I; du Pont de Nemours from 1 ~ 6  to 1932. Under this plan each 
company was allotted a fixed percentage of the sales of certain types 
of powder, and the sales agents of each company were assigned terri- 
tories within which they were to act'for both companies. The effect 
of this arrangement as to nitrocellulose powder was to maintain a . 
market for Nobel in Europe through the forbearance of du Pont, in ! 
2 
spite of the fact that du Pont's powder was gentrally regarded as 
.#J : z  
superior. In other cases, a superior product may be degraded or with- 
drawn in order to prevent it from superseding a product heady .; 
established. g ,
The cartel arrangements concerning electric lamps illustrate the - 
impunity with which quality may be degraded. Under international1 i 
qartel agreements the American market has been resenred for the i 
American manufacturing companies, General Electric and Westing- 
house, and markets in other parts of the world have been allocated. i 
Protected from foreign competition, American manufacturers have I 
attempted to increase their business by reducing the durability of their 
light bulbs. They were able to find an excuse for their action in the 
fact that the efficiency of a light bulb is in inverse ratio to its length 
of He; but they were careful not to inform consumers of the decision 
to sacrifice durability, nor to allow an opportunity for the buyer to 
choose between more efficient and more durable bulbs. 
One purpose for which quality may be deliberately reduced is to , 
prevent a commodity sold at a low price from being substituted for 
another which the same vendor is able to sell at a higher price. 
Adulteration intended to accomplish this purpose was proposed in 
connection with the price differentials on methyl methacrylate which 
have already been referred to. Certain acute durchasers of dental sup- 
plies had discovered that they could obtain the methyl methacrylate , 
for dentures at an incredibly reduced price by buying it as commercial . 
mdding powder. As a consequence, the producers undertook to 
develop some means of preventing such purchases, which they referred 
to as "bootlegging." On March 15, 1940, the Vernon-Benschoff Co. 
wrote to the American Rohm & Haas Co. as follows: 
''Olri discussion of the Pure Food and Drug Law and pulling the 
acrylic denture under it leads me to wonder if the manufacturers of 
the commercial molding powders might not add an ingredient which 
would not affect the molding properties, but which would disquahfy 
it under the act. - 
"Under the very finicky regulations of 'the above act however, it 
may be the slightest trace of the right agent, too little to constitute 
harm to molding (or health either as a matter of fact) would suffice 
to have bootleg products in bad. 
"A millionth of one percent'of arsenic or lead might cause them to 
cohfiscate every bootleg unit in the country. There ought to be a trace 
of something that would make them rear up." 
3. AUocarion of Trade Tm*taries:--One of the most prevalent 
cartel methods is allocation of territories to individual concerns or 
groups. Each * participant undertakes no( to sell in territory assigned 
exclusively to others, and often agrees also not to sell to customers 
who are likely to export to such territory. The effect of such under- 
takings is to restrict investment abroad, to restrict expo* not only 
by cartel members but by their customers, and to deprive consumers 
of imported commodities. The purpose of such agreements is to 
acquire a monopolistic position in markets which are regarded as 
peculiarly valuable. 
Since the primary interest of American participants has consisted 
in the enjoyment of an unchallenged position in the rich domestic 
market of the United States, and perhaps the Canadian market, they 
have usually been willing to sacrifice possibilities of export and of 
investment abroad as the price of such a position. Similarly, foreign 
companies have been willing to purchase protection in other markets 
by foregoing sales in the United States. 
The arrangements between Imperial Chemical Industries and du 
Pont involve allocations of territory for 20 or more different classes of 
products. With exceptions for certain special products du Pont is 
granted exclusive rights in the United States and Central America 
and Imperial Chemical Industries exclusive rights in the British 
Empire except Canada. The two companies have agreed that they 
will exploit the Canadian, Brazilian, and Argentine markets through 
jointly owned subsidiaries. Both companies remain free to sell in 
other portions of the world. 
Territorial restrictions were applied to American manufacture of 
Diesel engines in an agreement between Allgemeine Elektrizitaets 
Gesebchaft, General Electric Co,  and BuschSulzer Bros. in May. 
1930. The license agreement provided that-"The territory in which 
such engines may be sold and used is the United States and all other 
countries of the world except Europe and the Dutch Colonies." 
Such arrangements to divide world markets upon a territorial basis 
impose rigid limits to the territoria expansion of international trade 
in cartelized industries. Whether the total amount of such trade for 
any particular country -is greater or less than it would have been in 
the absence of a cartel probably depends partly upon the strength and 
shrewdness of the parties to the bargain domiciled there and partly 
upon the importance which they attach to exclusive control of their 
home market. 
4. -Restriction of Supply:-In some cases cartel restrictions take the - 
form of absolute limits upon the amount which may be produced, 
sold, or exported. This form of restriAion obviously subordinates the 
eonsumersy demand for additional quantities to the industry's desire 
for additional prufits. Cartels which are formed to meet the socalled 
overproduction created by a declining market or by the appearance 
of new capacity are peculiarly likely to undertake direct limitation of 
supply. 
The tin cartel formed in 1931 was a conspicuous example, though 
it was peculiar in that - it was organized by an international govern- 
mental convention. An unsuccessful attempt in ~ c p g  to curtail the 
production of tin by purely private means was the origin of this quasi- 
public venture. A private association of tin producers, which at first 
controlled 21 percent of the annual output and subsequently attained 
control of between 50 and 75 percent, failed to restrict output because 
of differences of opihion as to policy and lack of suf5cie.t authority. 
The governments of British Malaya, Bolivia, the Dutch East Indies, 
and Nigeria established an International Tin Co-mmittee in 1931 and 
made restriction of output compulsory by law. 
- The international steel cartel has also relied upon restrictions of 
output and of'exports. In the late IF'S the producers of ~ e l ~ k r n ,  
France, Germany, Luxemburg, the Saar Valley, Austria, Czecho- 
slovakia, and Hungary adhered to a basic production quota which 
was calculated from the output of the first quarter of 1926. Total per- 
missible tonnage was fixed quarterly by .a management committee 
and was distributed among the participants according to agreed per- 
centages. A fund was established from which compensation was to be 
paid to national groups which did not produce their full quota and 
fines were assessed upon groups which exceeded their quotas. Subse- 
quently, during the I ~ ~ o ' s ,  a new agreement as to exports was devel- 
oped among producers in Belgium,. Germany, Saar, France, and Lux- 
emburg. Under this plan, a management committee made quarterly 
determinations of the amouht of steel to be exported and divided the 
totals among national groups according to percentages based upon 
their past exports. Like the previous plan, the export controls were 
accompanied by fines and indemnities for those who exceeded or fell 
below their quotas. 
5. Allocation of Production and of Industrial F&:--Closely asso- 
ciated with industry-wide programs for the restriction of output are 
arrangements which set limits upon the amount or nature of produc- 
tion by certain particular concerns. Occasionally these limits are stated 
as fixed quantities. More frequently they are stated as percentages of 
the output by other specified concerns. Where one concern over- 
shadows its fellows, such a system of allocation by percentages means 
that a decision by the dominant concern as to how much it will pro- 
duce prescribes automatic limits for the others. In other cases, the 
assigned- percentages deprive each producer of incentive to compete 
for more business against the others and thus tend to bring about 
a restriction of the total supply. Even more frequently the arrange- 
ment is to exclude particular concerns from producing designated types 
of commodities, so that control of the supply is left entirely in the 
hands of one or more enterprises to which each kind of commodity 
is assigned. - 
Many of these restrictions are imposed in connection with patent 
licenses and may be interpreted as expressions of the monopoly power 
enjoyed by the holder of a -patent. 
An instance of percentage limitation of a concern's output appears 
in the production of methyl methacrylate cast sheeting. A recent 
letter by a du Pont executive describes the way in which this limitation 
was temporarily set aside to prevent it from throttling the production 
of bomber noses and other war materials: 
- 
"I was up to see Mr. Haas Monday with respect to the licenses we 
hold to operate under his patents for making cast sheeting. You will 
perhaps recall that we are limited to 50 percent of his capacity. I 
8 
explained to Mr. Haas that we were booked up solid until October 
of the present year under this restriction and asked him whether he 
wanted us to tell the Government that we were limited by the license 
or whether he preferred to lift the restriction. He agreed to lift the 
restriction during the present emergency." 
Agreements by which cartel members are excluded from the produc- 
tion of particular types of commodity reserved for others are extremely 
frequent. One of the most conspicuous is that established in 1929 
between I. G. Farbenindustrie and the Standard Oil Co. of New 
Jersey. Standard described the result of this agreement as follows: 
"The I. G. are going to stay out of the oil business proper and we 
are going to stay out of the chemical business insofar as that has no 
bearing on the oil business." 
Cartels as Devices to Restrict Production and Technological 
Change: 
I. Restriction of Capacity to Produce:--Closely related to limitation 
of supply is restriction of new industrial capacity. Such restrictions 
are often undertaken when existing capacity is partly idle and there 
is a likelihood that new capacity will mean either larger production 
and declining prices or a further reduction in the output of estab- 
'. lished plants. Sometimes ef30rts are made to delay the construction 
of efficient plants to replace obsolescent ones. sometimes restriction is 
intended to retard the development of a substitute product which 
dnight permanently reduce the market for an older product. Some- 
times the primitry concern is to keep out of the industry enterprises 
which might be unwilling to collaborate in cartel policies. Often a 
restriction is intended to deal with two or more of these problems at 
once. 
In the nitrogen industry, European producers of synthetic nitrogen 
have resisted the construction of new plants in the United States for 
fear of so-called overproduction, while Chilean producers of natural 
nitrates have resisted the substitution of the synthetic for the natural 
product. 
, Productive capacity in the American magnesium industry was 
restricted before the present war by a cartel arrangement in which 
each participant accomplished a different purpose. The Aluminum 
Co. of America prevented the development of magnesium as an . 
important substitute for aluminum. Dow Chemical Q. avoided the 
construction of competing plants which might have jeopardized 
Dow's high prices. I. G. Farbenindustrie avoided the risk of American 
exports to Europe. 
Similar restrictions were developed in the fabrication of magnesium 
in the United States by an arrangement under which the same cartel 
members cross-licensed each other but interposed obstacles to fabrica- 
tion by others. In consequence, the production and use of magnesium 
in this country lagged far behind the development in ~ e r m a n ~  and 
there was a serious shortage of experience and equipment for fabricat- 
ing magnesium at the outbreak of the <present war. 
2.  restriction^ Upon Invention and Technologicd Change:-Desir- 
ing to limit expansion of output and avoid the development of uncon- 
trolled substitute processes, cartels are necessarily suspicious of new 
technological developments. They readily undertake research to dis- 
cover new uses for their old products but often discourage the develop- 
ment of new processes or new products. 
In the desire to improve their patent position, large international 
concerns, which, acting together, can enjoy a monopoly of power 
based upon patents, usually spend substantial sums upon research. 
There is little doubt that the systematic conduct of experiments within 
a field of research which has already been laid out is expedited by 
such expenditures. There is dispute as to whether the routinized 
research of these large companies is equally successful in producing 
the basic inventions which open nkw fields of inquiry. Moreover, it 
is obvious that many of the inventions which take place in patent- 
controlled industries are not intended for industrial use, but are for 
the purpose of fencing-in an industrial field; that is, patenting the 
process in order to prevent others from making use of the invention. 
In industries in which patents are used as the basis of industrial 
power, exchange of patents among the parties to a cartel agreement 
broadens the field of use of particular inventions and makes a larger 
portion of the technology available to each participating concern. 
In some cases in which companies are bound together by permanent 
agreement to exchange patents and processes, there is an interchange 
of the details of operating experience, described as "know how." If 
such candid exchanges were general, the situation within the cartel 
would approach that which would prevail in the economy generally 
if all new inventions were dedicated to the public use. Indeed, it 
would involve even less concealment of trade secrets. But in practice 
.Is 
the tehnical advantages of pooled information are subordinated to 
commercial considerations, and exchanges of information are often 
strictly limited. The exchange of information among parties to the 
cartel agreement is dependent upon the working out of methods to 
prevent them from competing. In some cartels a dominant company , 
seeks to preserve and'strengthen its position by discouraging research 
on the' part of other companies. 
Among cartel members the commercial application of technical . 
progress is often retarded. When an invention of fundamental char- 
acter appears likely to bring about sharp reductions in demand or a 
rapid obsolescence of established productive processes, a cartel is likely 
to delay introduction of the process so long as it darei. 
The ingenuity of the research organizations which serve cartels is at . 
times perverted to the development of techniques by which the power 
of a cartel may be preserved. If a cartel has achieved high prices in 
selling to one group of customers, its scientists may be asked to pro- 
vide obstacles against efforts by these customers to buy cheaper goods 
elsewhere. This form of research is illustrated by the activities of one 
of the world's largest laboratories, engaged in organic chemical 
research for the du Pont Co. Du Pont had developed a pigment 
which could be used either as a paint or as a textile dye but feared 
that the latter use would upset the structure of prices upon textile 
dye-stufZs. 
In June 1940 the laboratory reported: ". . . Mr. Chantler was of 
the opinion that mixtures, unsuitable for textile printing 
would be very difficult to obtain." "Such substances as ground glass 
and carborundum were suggested for incorporation with the pigment. 
While these materials would undoubtedly scratch printing rolls, there 
is considerable doubt as to their effect in paints and lacquers." 
Two days later the matter was thoroughly discussed in a confer- 
ence with representatives of General Aniline Works. The resourceful- 
ness with which research in methods of- adulteration had been car- 
ried on appears in the following excerpts from a memorandum of the 
conference : 
"Detetiorate Cotton-Compounds might be incorporated into CPC 
which when applied to textiles and followed by bleaching or heating 
treatment might increase the deterioration of the cloth. Compounds 
such as chlorates or aliphatic halides which would produce hydro- 
chloric acid were specific examples. . . . 
"Irritating Substances-It is known that certain resins and solvents 
are irritating to the skin, often causing dermatitis. It might be pos- 
sible to formulate a CPC composition which will make textile mate- 
rials irritating to the skin. 
"Incorporation of Grit-It seemed too dangerous to attempt to add 
gritty material to CPC since, although it would interfere with the 
use of the material for textiles, it would also offer serious disadvan- 
tages in grinding on application of surface coatings. 
"It was agreed that the mere dulling of the material would not be 
a satisfactory solution since dull shades are often used in the textile 
trade. , . ." 
Information is lacking with which to estimate the relative propor- 
tion of the research effort of cartels which' is devoted to the improve- 
ment of industrial processes and products, to the development of 
patents which are intended to keep others out of an industrial field 
without being used by the patent owner, and to study of methods 
for the worsening of products such as have been described above. 
3. Eflorts to Weaken Independent Enterprises:-An almost inevi- 
table part of cartel policy is a concerted effort by cartel members to 
weaken independent concerns. The means available to a cartel are 
similar to those used by a domesic combination in restraint of t r a d e  
concerted efforts to cut off raw materials, organization of boycotts 
among distributors, exclusive dealing contracts, concerted refusals to 
grant patent licenses or permit access to technology, harrassment by 
litigation, localized price wars, and similar forms of pressure. The 
contracts &eady described, by which independents are deprived of 
the services of inventors or of the opportunity to license their inven- 
tions to concerns which deal wi& the cartel, express efforts to weaken 
independents. Threats of patent litigation are often success£ul in 
forcing an independent concern to come to terms with the cartel. 
+ The Relation of Cartelization to Eficiency:-The effect of cartels 
upon the efficiency of industrial production cannot be directly deter- 
mined without examination of comprehensive records of cost extend- 
ing aver considerable periods of time. Such evidence as is available, 
however, indicates that the characteristic purposes of cartels point 
away from efficiency and that their activities tend to diminish 
efficiency. 
One of the most frequent purposes of cartelization is to prevent 
the destruction of relatively high cost enterprises. The endeavor is 
to share the business among the available concerns, with the necessary 
result that the least efficient obtain a claim to continued existence and 
to a specified market upon the same basis as the most efticientt. In 
the nitrogen cartel agreement of 1930, high cost concerns were actually 
given larger relative quotas than low cost concerns. . 
Except at times in Germanantrolled territory under the pressure 
of the Nazi government, price agreements by cartEls have usually 
established prices at levels mutually satisfactory, that is, levels which 
even the highest cost concerns were willing to accept. Thus cartels 
often set aside the function of competition in spurring businessmen 
to greater efficiency and in eliminating the in&cient, but seldom pro- 
vide alternative means to accomplish the same purpse. 
In the development of technology, mtels tend to enhance efficiency 
insofar as this result follows from a pooling of inventions and exchange 
of know-how, and to retard efficiency insofar as they keep new 
processes from being adopted and deprive nonmembers of an oppor- 
tunity to share in the benefits of technological progress. The claims of 
cartels to reduce the cost of ordinary business and industrial operations 
are very slight. 
With the minor exceptions just mentioned, the cartel pattern typi- 
cally consists of market.arrangements which do not lltufv the manage- 
ments of the various concerns. The opportunities to reduce the cost 
of production by such agreements are limited indeed. One is the 
chance to avoid some but not all of the costs which arise from 
fluctuation in the rate of output; for under a cartel, fluctuations based 
upon changes in demand must still take place sooner or later. Another 
possible saving, which, however, is not a true economy, may &me 
from the lower purchase prices upon raw materials which the cartel 
members may sometimes obtain if they have a monopolistic buying 
position. Set against these factors are the increases of cost which ordi- 
narily may be expected to result from restriction of output by the 
cartel. 
But assuming that cartels increase efficiency, the value of the 
achievement is questionable so long as cartel control endures. The 
interest of the community in greater efficiency is ordinarily based 
upon the belief that lower costs will lead to lower prices and thus 
enhance consumption. Efficiency in a monopolistic combination 
redounds primarily to the monopoly's own advantage and may not 
contribute much to the advantage of the community. 
POLITICAL ASPECTS 
International cartels involve agreements as to international trade 
among business enterprises domiciled in several nations. Frequently 
certain parties to such an agreement are themselves international cor- 
porate combines with properties in various nations and with subsidi- 
aries and dliates incorporated under the laws of these nations. In 
developing and executing cartel arrangements the participants neces- 
sarily formulate policies toward international trade and toward the 
exchange of information across national boundaries. Such policies 
necessarily have political implications. 
National states, like cartels, may undertake to restrict trade. But 
whereas cartel restrictions are intended to serve the interests of cartel 
members throughout the world at the expense of outsiders, the restric- 
tions imposed by national states are intended to serve interests in a 
particular nation at the expense of interests in other countries. Thus 
cartel restrictions may conflict with national restrictions; and to 
become an instrument of restrictive national policy in one country 
a cartel must be also a means of attack upbn the national interests of 
other countries. Cartels may express the collective interests of pro- 
ducing countries in exploiting consuming countries; but since cartels 
are international, they might be expected to .resist subordination to 
a particular producting country's national policy, and doubtless many 
of them do so. However, when a cartel is dominated by the enter- 
prises of a single nation, the economic control expressed in cartel policy 
may take a political form as well, so that the activities of the cartel 
supplement and reinforce the activities of the national state in which 
the dominant concerns are domiciled. 
The likelihood of such a result increases when the political purposes 
of the national state are consistent with the restrictive policies of 
cartel members in other countries, so that the national advantages 
thereby achieved do not involve any immediate business injury to 
foreign cartel members. A cartel may readily be used for political 
ends if one nation's participating enterprises are politically minded 
whereas those of other nationalities are concerned primarily with their 
business interests. 
The likelihood that national politics will influence a Artel is greatest 
where the distinction between government and business is not sharply 
maintained. In democratic states, with a tradition of business freedom 
from governmental control, businessmen are seldom expected to 
become the means of carrying out national policy and are likely, 
regardless of expectations, to follow their own line. 
In the instances of conflict between cartel policies and national 
policies, two different types of motivation are evident. In some cases 
cartel members were pursuing their business ends without regard to 
the national interests of other countries or the national policy of their 
own country. In other instances, .cartel members were consciopsly 
serving the -political and economic purposes of a particular national 
state, sometimes willingly and soriietimes reluctantly. Often both 
motives were present-some participants acted willingly while others 
acted far -business reasons. In general, American concerns were 
unaware of or indifferent to the political significance of their acts, 
but took part in cartels for business reasons. 
Cartels and National Commercial Policy: 
One of the most widespread of cartel activities is the allocation of 
trade territories and industrial fields among the members of the cartel. 
Such allocations necessarily express private international trade policies 
which often conflict with, modify, or supersede the trade policies of 
national governments. Cartel controls are supplements or substitutes 
for the State's control of trade by tariffs, export and import licenses, 
trade agreements, antidumping laws, and the rationing of foreign 
exchange. 
The relationship of a cartel to the tariff may be readily illustrated 
from the chemical industry. Under an agreement between du Pont 
and Imperial Chemical Industries, the latter recognizes the United 
States market as the exclusive territory of du Pont for patented prod- 
ucts and in practice abstains from selling unpatented products here as 
well. Imperial Chemical Industries. controls almost the whole chemical 
industry of Great Britain; and its agreement with du Pont covers its 
entire line of chemical products, with a few important exceptions 
such as alkali. Thus the agreement is the practical equivalent of a 
prohibitory tariff upon the importation of British chemicals into the 
United States. Trade policy in the matter is made by the two great 
private companies and not by the American Government. 
Whereas tariffs are ordinarily used in an endeavor to encourage the 
development or maintenance of manufacture within the country which 
- 
imposes them, cartel regulations applicable to a particular national 
market are likely to limit or discourage manufacture. An instance 
is the control exercised by the quinine cartel over the United States 
market. More the present war the cartel followed a policy of allow- 
ing American manufacturers to make not more than half of our 
domestic requirements of quinine. Only two American companies 
were permitted to engage in manufacture, grid both were required 
to purchw cinchona bark exclusively from the cartel. The exclusive 
assignment of foreign territories to particular members of a cartel 
necessarily defeats the policiei of national governments which may 
be seeking to enlarge the flow of international trade between their 
countries .and parts of the world not allocated by the cartel to their 
f l a t i d .  
Althwgh private cartel arrangements may have the effect of tariffs, 
the promotion of higher national t d s  is often a part of the policy 
of those who participate in cartels. A tariff may strengthen a cartel 
member in his negotiation with other members for a larger share of 
the world market. Moreover, a tariff may give protection against 
independent enterprises which do not cooperate with the cartel and 
against cartel members who undertake price wars as a disciplinary 
or retaliatory device. 
When the policies of -a cartel and a particular national government 
are brought into harmony, the effect may be use of governmental 
restrictions to reinforce the power of the cartel or use of the cartel to 
aummplish the restrictive' purposes of the government. In 1938, the 
French Government evidently undertook to give effect to the terri- 
torial allocations of the .dyestuffs cartel. Various cartels dominated 
by German concerns during the period between the two World Wars 
were used by the German Government to maintain German exports 
and supplies of foreign exchange. 
International cartels have usually acted as substantial deterrents to 
the industrial development of parts of the world which their members 
regard as colonial markets. Typically they have resisted the rise of 
new enterprises abroad as well as at home. Cartels also resist the 
estabIishment or the extension of undertakings by local capital. Such 
policies of discouraging industrial development usually run counter 
to the aspirations of the national governments immediately concerned. 
In Latin America they run counter to the good-neighbor policy and 
the development programs fostered by the Government of the United 
States. 
Because of their international character, cartel arrangements often 
become convenient means by which to circumvent the legislation of 
national. states. Avoidance of import duties and other taxes, evasion 
of legal control over prices, arid similar activities are, of course, £re- 
quent among domestic enterprises. In international cartels, however, 
the aid of foreign concerns is often available to create the pretenses 
unde~  which' evasion takes place. Among the most conspicuous 
examples of attempts to nuly .  national law by action taken beyond 
a nation's boundaries are the efforts of cartels to extend their control 
ov& the United States and yet evade the jurisdiction of the American 
anti-trust laws. 
Cartels and National Security: 
In cartel policy, as in that of national states, trade relationships 
often have diplomatic and military as well as economic significance. 
The allocation of trade territories to German, British, or American 
interests establishes exclusive trading ties which facilitate the devel- 
opment of political understandings among the governments of coun- 
tries thus bound together by cartel policy. 
The security problems raised by cartels during the last quarter- 
- century have centered upon the revival of the military strength 
of Germany and the political and military preparations of the Nazi 
government for the present war. With cartel members outside 
Germany often politically indifferent and in some cases subservient 
to dominant German enterprises, and with the German members 
of cartels increasingly subjected to the control of the state, cartel 
activities between the two wars contributed to the development of 
a rearmed and aggressive Germany and to the weakening of states 
- which were likely to oppose German national policy. 
I Cards and German Rearmament:-The reestablishment of cartel 
connections between German and Allied concerns in the munitions 
industries apparently aided in creating an atmosphere of acquiescence 
to the revival of German munitions production during the 1920's~ 
in violation of the Treaty of Versailles. 
2. Cartf;~ and Nazi Propaganda:-After the Nazi government came 
into power, cartels vere extensively used for trade penetration, politi- 
cal propaganda, collection of strategic information about foreign 
industries, and efforts to suppress the development of strategic indus- 
tries in areas which might be hostile to Germany. 
In some cases, the trade alliance created by an international cartel 
was so close that it resulted in the transmission of strategically impor- 
tant industrial information to German citizens and presumably to 
the German government, to the detriment of the military security 
of other nations. With public officials kept ignorant of the character 
of cartel arrangements as to the transfer of idormation, intimate 
details concerning technology, business operations, and even produc- 
tion for military use were -sometimes sent abroad. 
The effect of various cartel arrangements in strategic industries 
was also to prevent the development outside ' ~ e r m a n ~  of a substantial 
production of some -of the most important new materials of war. 
This was the direct and necessary consequence of policies of restric- 
tion of output, restriction of new capacity, and suppression of new 
technology, such as are characteristic of cartels. 
In the case of magnesium, a cartel arrangement between I. G. 
Farbenindustrie, the Aluminum Co. of America, and Dow Chemical 
Co. established Dow as the sole producer of the metal in the United 
States. d high-price policy, followed by Dow for its own purposes 
and under pressure of the Aluminum Co.'s insistence that Dow not 
offer a cheap substitute for aluminum, kept the output small. In 1938, 
when German had reached 12,000 tons, United States 
production was only 2,400 tons. Moreover, Dow's exports were 
limited to a specified amount to a single customer in Great Britain, 
and to certain quantities which I. Go Farbenindustrie agreed to buy. 
Dow might not otherwise export to the European Continent. 
In the case of aluminum, soon after the Nazi Government took 
power German aluminum producers, apparently acting under govern- 
mental pressure, insisted that they must no longer be bound by-the 
restrictions imposed upon production by the international aluminum 
cartel. The apprehension of aluminum producers in other countries 
lest the increased German output reduce the European price was 
allayed by an agreement that if there should be any increase in 
German exports it would be fully offset by an equivalent increase 
in Germany's imports. Thus the cartel continued its price proteaion 
in nonoGerman markets by cheerful acquiescence in a policy which 
assured to Germany a superiority in aluminum supply. The produc- 
tion of Diesel engines in the_ United States was apparently retarded 
by the arrangements between American Bosch and Robert Bosch of 
Germany. 
Cartels and Economic Warfare: 
The outbreak of war in 193  intensified the problem as to the 
relation between national policies and cartel policies. Most cartels 
recognized immediately that some modification of their pre-war 
arrangements was made necessary by the new obstacles to freedom 
of trade and free interchange of information. The cartel connections 
between companies in belligerent nations were often wholly or partly 
suspended under arrangements which contemplated the full renewal 
of the agreement as soon as political conditions might permit. Cartel 
members in neutral countries typically preserved their business con- 
nections with their cartel partners on both sides of the conflict, with 
some modification of contracts to fit the new trading conditions. 
As between belligerent cartel members, problems arose as to how far 
trade connections might be maintained without violation of laws 
against trading with the enemy. Cartel members in neutral countries 
found it necessary to determine how far they would collaborate in 
proposals designed to serve the interests of one belligerent as against 
another. 
In some cartels in which the relation of German and American 
partners was very close, the American company undertook to safe- 
guard its cartel interest and serve its German partner by forestalling 
British measures to blockade enemy trade. I£ the Germans had for- 
merly enjoyed exclusive rights in the South American market, permis- 
sion has-g&en by German cartel members to their American partners 
to supply the South American customers during the emergency pro- 
vided the American concerds agreed to withdraw from the field after 
the war. Less frequently the American partner assisted the German 
company in obtaining supplies for shipment to Germany or in bor- 
rowing funds abroad. 
During the period prior to America's entry into the war, American 
paaicipants in cartels or corporate combines sometimes found. their 
~urop&n establisliments or their European cartel partners and licenses 
in territory dominated by the A x i s .  Under these circumstances the 
desire to maintain a prosperous business, coupled with the cartel con- 
nections already established with German concerns, sometimes facili- 
tated a decision to cooperate with the conquerors. 
Steps were also taken in various industries to bring about transfers 
of property and assignments of patent rights which would convert 
foreign property into domestic property. Two motives appear. On 
the one hand, there was a desire to avoid the difficulties of wartime 
communication by transferring to each member of a cartel the control 
over properties to which that member had easy access. On the other 
hand, there was a desire to conceal the foreign ownership of prop- 
erties in order to forestall possible application of freezing regulations, 
seizure by Alien Property Custodians, or other impairment of prap- 
erty rights in the interests of national policy. Immediately after the 
outbreak of the war, in September 1939, Standard Oil Co. of New 
Jersey worked out with I. Go Farben a readjustment of business to 
avoid seizure of property in the countries in which the two companies 
had patents. . 
A peculiarly interesting attempt to safeguard an international com- 
bine by changing its apparent national character was made by the 
No V. Philips organization. Before the war approximately 80 Philips 
companies located primarily in Europe and South America were con- 
trolled by a holding company in Eindhoven, Holland. Anticipating 
the invasion of Holland, Philips took advantage of the Corvo law, 
which apparently had k n  passed at its instigation, to move the head 
offices of the company from Holland to Curacao, in the Dutch West 
Indies, It entered into two trust agreements, respectively, with a 
British' and an American bank, under which provisional trusteeships 
were established over the Philips companies. The Midland Bank was 
given jurisdiction over those in the ~ & s h  Empire, the Hardord 
Bank and Trust Co. over those in North and South America and 
in Spain and Portugal.- The Curacao company was to continue to 
control the subsidiaries in the Dutch East Indies, Sweden, and Switzer- 
land. The trust agreements sought to combine a formal transfer of 
authority to British and American nationals with an actual retention 
of power by the Philips executive so long as they retained their free- 
dom to act. 
The most dangerous aspect of cartelization in wartime lies in the 
continuance of mutual loyalties and of joint property interests which 
unite concerns lying on opposite sides of the battle lines. Such con- 
nections with enemy nationals provide a standing incentive for q u a  
fied allegiance to one's own belligerent nation. The existence of estab- 
lished contacts with enemy, concerns through concerns in peutra1 
countries affords a constant opportunity to promote trade interests by 
transmitting information and even supplies which may be of value 
to the enemy. 
The problem is at its maximum in the wartime relationships of the 
subsidiaries and aftiliates of a far-flung international combine parts 
- of which lie in enemy territory. The problem for such a combine is 
not a simple conflict between patriotism and greed. There is a natural 
desire to maintain property and profits. This desire is reinforced by 
a persistent memory that if these can somehow survive. the war a 
period will recur in which international trade and investment are 
generally approved and by knowledge that even the laws of war 
traditionally respect the property rights of private citizens except 
where they intedere with military operations. There is also an aware- 
ness that refusal by any part of such a combine to collaborate with 
the belligerent government controlling the country 05 its domicile 
would merely lead to measures enforcing cooperation. The sacrifice 
of property rights in a futile attempt to defeat the purposes of military 
government is felt to be quixotic. In cultivating round-about trade 
and exchange of information between belligerent countries, both parts 
of the combine are aware of a national interest in-receiving what is 
obtained from the other country and sometimes even in maintaining 
national export trade. This view is reinforced by the fact that upon 
occasion belligerent governments tacitly consent to the barter of goods 
with the enemy through neutral intermediarik. With the steady 
pressure of self-interest on the one side, and the inherently complex 
character of patriotic duty on the other, it is easy for the directors 
of a corporate combine to persuade themselves that there is no treason 
in the pursuit of an obvious business advantage. 
The peculiar conflict in the loyalties of an international combine 
becomes most evident in the activities of its branches in neutral coun- 
tries. Such branches are sometimes subject to the direction of a central 
office maintained in the country of one belligerent but dependent for 
supplies and markets upon the territory of another belligerent. In 
sucii cases their continued existence depends upon finding means to 
evade managerial instructions or to obtain orders consistent with their 
continued prosperity. 
Postwar Planning by Cartels:, 
The trend of cartel activity after the war will be profoundly 
aflected by the military outcome. Great German cornpan& have been 
used during the war as the nuclei of international combines which, 
should they persist, necessarily will involve more extensive carteliza- 
tion of the European Continent. The Hermann Goering Works, for 
ample ,  has grown through investments by the Reich, forced invest- 
ment by private firms, co&scations of property, and purchase of prop- 
erty. In 1941, it controlled nearly IOO percent of Austrian and 
Rumanian iron and steel production and more than 50 percent of 
Polish iron and steel production. It also controlled nearly all of the 
output of copper in Yugoslavia, nearly 80 percent of the production 
of lignite in the Sudetenland, and more than 50 percent of the shipping 
on the Danube. It was established in armament manufacture, con- 
struction, and trade from Norway to Rumania. Similarly, the war 
has extended the control exercised by I. G. Farbenindustrie over the 
manufacture of dyestuffs in Europe. 
Assuming complete defeat of the Axis, arrangements such as these 
presumably will not endure. The character of the cartel problem in 
a post-war world established by the United Nations may be partially 
forecast on the basis of the present activities and plans of those who 
support cartels. 
Many cartel arrangements are still in effect, with modifications 
designed to meet conditions of war. Their continuance is evidence 
of an *ntion to maintain them in either an original or a modified 
form after the war. In many cases, however, post-war cartel plans 
are not matters of inference. Suspension of cartel arrangements in 
wartime and their renewal as soon as possible thereafter has been 
provided for by specific agreement. 
Plans of cartelization after the war are not limited to the resumption 
of agreements previously in effect. There are a considerable number 
of ambitious proposals to form new cartel agreements and greatly 
extend the scope of cartelization. 
Such plans are of two types: First, there 'are programs in particular 
industries to eliminate competition among some or all of the concerns 
engaged therein. -. 
Second, various programs have been advanced for cartelization of 
all industries with the approval of the governments of the principal 
trading nations. In a recent discussion with the president of the 
United States Chamber of Commerce, Lord McGowan, chairman of 
the board of Imperial Chemical Industries, declared that he saw no 
hope for post-war cooperation between British and American business 
unless the American Sherman Act were repealed: One of the refugee 
executives of the N. V. Philips Co. in the United States has formulated 
a plan for general cartelization after the war. 
The most ambitious of the publicly announced programs is that of 
the World Trade Alliance, which is promoted from England by 
Sir Edgar Jones, an executive of the international tin plate cartel. 
This organization is engaged in propaganda for an industry-wide 
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